ROLL OF HONOR.

It is very gratifying for men and women of to-day to find an ancestor's name en the pension rell of the Revolution. It will be equally gratifying in the future for a man's descendants to find that he was on the pension roll of the War of

The National Tribune.

ROLL OF HONOR

It is very gratifying for men and women the pension rell of the Revolution. It will be equally gratifying in the future for a man's descendants to find that he was on the pension roll of the War of

ONE DOLLAR A YEAR.

WASHINGTON, D. C., THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 1904.

VOL. XXIII-NO. 39.-WHOLE NO. 1194.



Campaions of the Army of the Potomac

for the morrow.

REBEL

WARREN

Bartlett's Brigade. Dispositions were then made by the Fifth and Ninth Corps

for the battle which was determined on

OLD-TIME POSITIONS OF ARMIES REVERSED.

are here again on classic ground; for it

was here that the battle of Gaines's Mill,

the first of the series of actions in Mc-

now drawn, however, there was this dif-

LEXANDERS BRIDGE

A Critical History of Operations in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania from the Commencement to the Close of the War. 1861-1865.

- By WILLIAM SWINTON.

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COLD HARBOR.

Gallant Attempt to Break Through the Army of Northern Virginia and End the War at One Blow-Appalling Slaughter in a Few Minutes-Flanking Resumed.

The Chickahominy may be regarded as a wet ditch in front of the outer fortifications of Richmond, It was therefore absolutely necessary, for further advance upon the line taken up by Gen. Grant, to force the passage of this stream. But it was clear from the development of the enemy's strength that the effort to carry a direct crossing where the two armies faced each other, had little promise of success. It was accordingly judged advisable to extend toward the left and endeavor to pass the Chickahominy below by a movement by Cold Harbor. This place, which, as the point of convergence of all the roads leading whether to Richmond or to White Lee's. House (new the depot of supplies of the army), was to be considered as a strategic point of the first importance, had been secured after a brisk action by Sheridan's cavalry on the afternoon of the 31st. The same night the Sixth Corps was detached from the extreme right of the army and directed on Cold Harbor, toward which also a body of troops from Butler's command was then en route. On this point explanation may be necessary. PORTIONS OF BUTLER'S COMMAND CALLED.

Finding that Butler, after his retirement within the cul-de-sac of Bermuda Hundred, could readily hold his narrow front with a fractional force, Gen. Grant ordered him to form all that could be spared into a movable column and forward it to make a junction with the Army of the Potomac. Accordingly, on the 29th of May, a force of 16,000 men, under Gen. W. F. Smith, made up of four divisions taken from the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, was embarked on transports in the James, River, and after passing down the James, and ascending the York and Pamunkey, debarked at White House on the following day. Here Gen. Smith received orders from the headquarters of Gen. Grant to move his command to New Castle, on the south side of the Pamunkey. (39) It will be observed that a movement on that point must throw Smith completely out of position in relation to the Army of the Potomac, then fronting the Chickahominy—a fact that was sufficiently evident to that officer on his arrival there, on the night of the 31st, after a long and fatiguing march. It was not, however, till the following morning that he learned from an officer of Gen. Grant's staff that his orders had been wrongly worded—that instead of New Castle it was New Cold Harbor he was designed to reach, and that in consequence he had made an unnecessary march of 10 or 15 miles. Upon this, Gen. Smith countermarched his column, and on the afternoon of that day (June 1) reached Cold Harbor, where the Sixth Corps, detached, as already seen, from the right of the Army of the Potomac, had just arrived. At Cold Harbor Gen. Smith was met with orders from Gen Meade to take position on the right of the Sixth Corps and cooperate with it in an immediate attack. (40)

LONGSTREET'S FIRST LINE TAKEN. Now, as soon as the Sixth Corps was withdrawn from the right of the army, Lee, detecting the procedure, and sus-pecting its object, met this manuver by withdrawing Longstreet's Corps from his own left, and directing it towards Cold Harbor, to cover there any attempt to force the passage of the Chickahominy; so that when Wright and Smith arrived, it was no longer the slight force encoun tered by Sheridan that they were to meet The enemy was descried in force holding position behind Cold Harbor in a thick wood, to reach which it was necessary to the assault was made very spiritedly, the troops advancing over the open space un-der a very severe fire. Both the left of Smith's line and the right of the Sixth Corps succeeded in carrying the first line of rifle-trenches, capturing between them 600 prisoners. It was, however, found quite impracticable to carry the second line, and the troops rested on their arms

WARREN'S LINES PENETRATED. Great as was the loss in this action, it which it was indispensable to hold; for Gen. Grant had determined there to force the passage of the Chickahominy, and compel Lee to retire within the intrenchments of Richmond. Hancock's Corps. which, since the withdrawal of the Sixth Corps from the line of the Tolopotomy. formed the right of the army, was ordered that night from its position, and directed to Cold Harbor to take position on the left of the Sixth Corps. Warren's Corps continued near Bethesda Church, and though holding a line excessively long ecuting this movement, the enemy, detecting it, followed up with a line of battle, contemplated extension to the left, and could only be reached by covered ways. compelled him to act on the defensive at In less than an hour Hancock's loss was dinary campaigns than a kind of running once, to avert any possible disaster. The above 3,000.

enemy's saily was, however, not made with much vigor, and was readily repulsed by 39. Gen. Smith's Report: Order from 29. Gen. Grant, dated Hanovertown May 28. The precise terms of the order to mith were quite peculiar; for he was said to "hold the road from Cold Ethesda Church" (Warren's an attack." As Gen. Smith's force many places along the traveled roads in England, and means simply, "shelter without the first part of his instructions and resolved to execute the second—that is, attack.

above 3,000.

EVERY ASSAULT A DISASTER.

The story of the advance of the Sixth. The story of the from the Rapidan to the Chicka-hominy the face of the country was covered with the intrenched lines, withthe intrenched lines, with the sixth of the Potomac and of Northern Virginia, had waged a succession of deadly conflicts. At every advance, Lee was able to meet his adversary with a front of opposition, and within his improvised strongholds exact a heavy price in 43. This phrase, "as far as the example of their officers could carry them." I take from the Report of Gen. Hancock. It is true of the whole army, and to these who witnessed that terrible slaughter, will have an almost pathetic significance.

utmost that could be done.

To the right of the Fifth Corps was strung out a line so thin and extended, that beyond holding its own, it was hopeless for that corps to attempt to do more. The Ninth Corps made no attack at the hour ordered; but Gen. Burnside got two set his dissipance sound in position to as to the right to make the Confederate posi-tion at that point very difficult to hold; and by afternoon Gen. Burnside was prepared to assail the enemy's left. Long before that time, however, the action had

been suspended. The action was decided, as I have said in an incredibly brief time in the morn-ing's assault. But, rapidly as the result was reached, it was decisive; for the consciousness of every man pronounced fur-their assault hopeless. The troops went forward as far as the example of their officers could carry them(43): nor was it pos-Cold Harbor, where Gens. Grant and Meade established their headquarters for sible to urge them beyond; for there they knew lay only death, without even the the impending passage at arms, is no harbor, as the name might imply, for it is chance of victory. The completeness with quite inland: (41) nor is it even a center of which this judgment had been reached by quite inland; (41) nor is it even a center of population, nor so much as a collection of the whole army was strikingly illustrated farm-houses, but a mere locality, having by an incident that occurred during the all its importance from the convergence of forenoon. Some hours after the failure of the first assault, Gen. Meade sent instrucroads there. Behind it runs the Chickations to each corps-commander to renew hominy, and the map will reveal that we the attack without reference to the troops on his right or left. The order was issued through these officers to their subordinate Clellan's retrograde movement across the commanders, and from them descended Peninsula, was fought. As the lines were through the wonted channels; but no man stirred, and the immobile lines pronounced ference, that the relative situations of the a verdict, silent, yet emphatic, against further slaughter. The loss on the Union side combatants were quite reversed-Lee holding McClellan's position and Grant in this sanguinary action was over 13,000, while on the part of the Confederates, it is

GAINES'S MILL

repulsed most disastrously; and to retain possession of an advanced position, more or less close to the enemy's line was the utmost that could be done.

To the right of the Fifth Corps was commander was never able to crush his opponent, who, thrown again and again in the mighty wrestle, each time rose quickly to his feet. Foiled in the effort to force hour ordered; but Gen. Burnside got two of his divisions round in position to as sail the enemy's left flank, and by noon had one brigade posted across the eastern tions were executed with much address end of the Shady Grove road. This force warmly engaged the enemy. The batteries of the corps worked sufficiently far round to the positions in the Wilderness, before Spotsylvania, on the North Anna, and along the Pamunkey. Thus, by battles and marches, the army, in 30 days and 30 nights, reached the Chickshominy.

Now, it will be observed that each of these turning movements, up to the ! hickahominy, brought the army nearer at each leap to the objective of all its efforts, Richmond. But, once before the Chickahominy, the series of flanking operations was exhausted; for any additional move by the left would throw the army rot towards, but away from Richmond. It. therefore, it was designed to push the advance by the line on which the army was now acting, and on which Gen. Grant had declared he would "fight it out, if it took all Summer," (44) it was was absciutely carried by a coup de main.

OVERLAND CAMPAIGN REALLY ACCOM-PLISHED NOTHING. But as the alternative was either to

that line of operations altogether, Gen. upshot of the action at Cold Harbor, was with the view to carry the position by regular approaches. It was not long, however, before the unpromising aspect of the result that would follow even a successful issue on the Chickahominy gave pause to this purpose, and finally led to the adop-tion of an altogether new line of manuver. In the discussion of the "overland route," with which the recital of this cam-paign opened, I have shown that any advance on that line ends in the siege of the uninvested fortifications of Richmond within which the defending army, with all its lines of communication open, right remain indefinitely. It was no doubt from the perception of the altogether indecisive nature of this result that Gen. Grant, after 10 days passed along the Chicka-hominy, resolved to execute another flank movement, which should throw the army to the south side of the James River. Now, as this change of base ended the opera-tions on the "overland route," it would seem also to challenge a judgment on the merits of that enterprise, considered as a

march an operation against the communi-cations of Richmond by a transfer of the army to a point on the coast. The results thus far accomplished on the former line would appear to justify his primal choice. As the overland campaign was unsuccessful either in the destruction of Lee's army or the capture of Richmond, and as that line of operations was at length abandoned, the gross result would seem bor it must be said, that it is difficult to see how battles can be won on the principle here adopted. If to be superior to aright this loss, unless it be considered in its relations with the cost at which it was

It has been seen that Gen. Grant him-

purchased. In this regard, it must be considered. the balance was very much in favor of the enemy. Grant's loss in the series of actions from the Wilderness to the Chickahominy reached the enormous aggregate of 60,000 men put hors de combat(45)-a number greater than the entire strength of Lee's army at the opening of the campaign. He had inflicted on Lee a loss of 20,000—the ratio being one to three.(46)

The Confederates, elated at the skilful manner in which they had constantly been thrust between Richmond and the Union army, and conscious of the terrible price in blood they had exacted from the latter; were in high spirit, and the morale of Lee's army was never better than after the battle of Cold Harbor.(47)

44. "I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all Summer."-Dispatch

45. I append a statement of nalties in the Army of the Potomac in the battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor.

Wilderness, May 5 to 12—Killed: Officers, 269; enlisted men, 3,019. Wounded: Officers, 1,017; enlisted men, 18,261. Missing: Officers, 177; enlisted men, 6,667. Aggregate, 29,410. Spotsylvania, May 12 to 21-Killed Officers, 114; enlisted men, 2.032. Wound

ed: Officers, 259; enlisted men, 7,697. Missing: Officers, 31; enlisted men, 248. Ag-North Anna, May 21 to 31-Killed: Officers, 12; enlisted men, 138. Wounded: Officers, 67; enlisted men, 1,063. Missing: Officers, 3; enlisted men, 324. Aggregate,

Cold Harbor, June 1 to 10-Killed: Of ment held the works beyond. But so little consideration had been given in advance to the dispositions of attack, that it was officers, 144; enlisted men, 1,561. Wounded: Officers, 421; enlisted men, 8,621. Missing: Officers, 51; enlisted men, 2,355. Aggre-

Total officers killed, 539; wounded. 1.764; missing, 262. Total enlisted men killed, 6,750; wound ed, 35,642; missing, 9,594. Total casualties, officers and enlisted

men, 54,551. But to this must be added the casualties of the Ninth Corps, which, up to the battle of Cold Harbor, was independent of Meade's command. Counting these 5,000, renewal of the attack was seen to be so or less than one-half the average of the void of all show of success, that at 1:30 other corps, we obtain an aggregate of other corps, we obtain an aggregate of above 60,000 men. It will be observed

that the loss in officers was especially severe, reaching in all 3,000. These were generally the flower of the officers of the Army of the Potomac, the bravest of the brave men whose loss to the army was irreparable.

46. In stating the casualties of the Confederate army at 20,000, I place the ag gregate somewhat higher than that obgregate somewhat higher than that obtained from the Confederate sources of information to which I have had access. Gen. Lee's Adjutant-General in conversation with the writer, gave 18,000 as his impression of the loss. This number corresponds remarkably with that derived from a comparison of the force with which Lee opened the campaign and that present after the battle of Cold Hartor. The former was 52,626, and on May 31 it was 44,247, the difference being somewhat above 8,000. But meanwhile Lee had received accessions to his strength—7,000 celved accessions to his strength—7,000 men under Pickett, from Petersburg, and 2,000 under Breckinridge, from the Valley. This would make his loss, no to Cold Harbor, 17,000; and adding 1,000 for the cas-

bor, 17,000; and adding 1,000 for the casualties of that battle (an over-estimate), we obtain an aggregate of 18,000.

47. I have until lately taken a different view of the condition of Lie's army at this time, inferring that the defere strain to which it had been constantly subjected must have shain its placale. In first writing touching this part of the campaign, I used the following language: "There was one result of a purely moral order that sprang from this campaign, that had, without doubt, a considerable influence on its issue. The very relentlessness with which Gen. Grant dealt his blows, and sacrificed lives to deal these blows, assumed at length to the enemy the aspect.

The Solemn Duty of Married Soldiers.

T does not follow, as a matter of course, if a man was a soldier, even if he is a pensioner, that it

will be an easy matter for his widow to get a pension. As a matter of fact, widows' cases are unnecessarily delayed, and in some cases never allowed for lack of evidence, which the husband, usually, could have supplied during his lifetime.

This important matter has been discussed, from time to time, in the columns of The National Tribune, and has been made the subject of orders by Commanders-in-Chief of the Grand Army, but every appeal heretofore was deficient in one important featnecessary to force the passage of the Chickahominy. The result of the battle of Cold Harbor, fought on the 3d of May, was to show that this line could not be

The National Tribune Co., in a practical way, proposes to supply this deficiency. In a fire-proof room, in its own building, and under lock and key to force a crossing of this stream or abandou insure privacy, it will care for such papers and infor-Grant's first impulse after the disastrous mation until such time as they may be needed, even if to order the initiation of siege operations, such time is many years distant. The National Tribune Co. is incorporated. Having a perpetual existence, the death of the present managers of the Company will not disturb the business or change the custody of the papers. No safer place in the world can be found for the purpose.

But The National Tribune will go further in this commendable work. It will assist in getting in shape the proofs and information required. The first step for every comrade is to answer the few simple questions that are printed below under the heading "Preliminary Report." This report will disclose the case and enable The National Tribune to complete all the

There will be no charge whatever for this service, but it will be expected of every comrade that he will call the attention of at least one other married comrade to this matter and influence the other comrade to do likewise. No other missionary work among comrades can be productive of more good. Many comrades who are not subscribers to The National Tribune will not learn of this important service if subscribers do not call their attention to it. Extra papers will be sent for distribution upon request.

Comrades who attend to this matter promptly will be taking the best possible step toward securing for their widows the higher rate of pension: that is, \$12 a month instead of \$8.

Preliminary Report

proof required.

To aid my widow, if I leave one, in getting her pension.

NOTE. - This report is short, and can be easily written out on letter or legal cap paper. This course avoids cutting the paper. sure to write the names and dates clearly and distinctly. When report is ready mail it to R. W. Shoppell, Attorney, or The National Tribune,

	Date, 1904.
Soldier's Name	, P. O,
State I was in the servi	ce from, 186, to
the, 186, as a	(Give rank, company and regiment.)
and was honorably discharged at	, on theday
of, 186 Are you a pensioner	? At what rate? \$ per month.
Were you pensioned under the old law or the new?	(The new law is the act of June 27, 1890.)
	ritten on your pension certificate?
	•
	on theday of
18, by(Give name of clergyman or person officiating.)	, at
At marriage my age was	Her age was
Is there a public or church record of this marriage?	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Were either of you previously married?	
Remarks:(If remarks are of considerable length to	they should be written on a separate sheet of paper.)

All About the New "Age" Order.

"AGE" ORDER.

The laws of June 27, 1890, and May 9, 1900, provide for a pension, according to TO GENERAL LAW PENSIONERS DRAWING degree of disability, from \$6 to \$12 per month for any soldier of the War of the

Rebellion who served 90 days and was honorably discharged.

The new "AGE" Order simply says that out further proof (and, inferentially, without examination) to be suffering disability sufficient to warrant \$6 a month pension at age of 62; \$8 a month at age of 65; \$10 a month at age of 68 and \$12 a month at

To Those Who Have Never Applied for Pension.

The estimate is that there are 162.000 soldiers of the War of the Rebellion who have never applied for pension, and that the majority of them are over 62 years of age. We urge upon these comrades that it is their duty to apply. If many are so well-to-do that they do not need it, they can apply the money to help those who do need it. A pensioner contributes to the prosperity of his neighborhood. Every dollar he draws and puts into circulation serves the whole community before it finally goes back to the Treasury. The pension list is really a Roll of Honor. Under this "AGE" Order an application can be made that, in most cases, does not involve examination, which probably removes a feature that was objectionable to many.

It is not often in war that a belligerent

is in condition to afford a sacrifice thus

disproportionate; nor can results thus achieved be accounted the proof and pro-

THE LAW OF JUNE 27, 1890, AND THE NEW, Write to R. W. Shoppell, or The National | of 70. If the claimant can not show that Tribune, Washington, D. C., and a proper blank will be mailed you without cost.

LESS THAN \$12.

If under the law of June 27, 1890, as construed by the New "AGE" Order, which is given elsewhere, a pensioner will receive an increase, he should write to R. W. any claimant who has arrived at the age Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Washington, D. C., and a proper blank will be

> TO PENSIONERS UNDER THE ACT OF JUNE 27, 1890, WHO ARE RECEIVING LESS THAN

Read very carefully the new "AGE" Order given in another column. If it allows you more pension than you are now receiving, write to R. W. Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Washington, D. C., and a proper blank will be mailed you

TO REJECTED CLAIMANTS.

Any one over 62 years of age whose claim, under any law, was rejected should write to R. W. Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Washington, D. C., and a proper blank will be mailed you without cost.

TO THOSE WISHING TO ALLEGE MORE DIS-ABILITY THAN IS PRESUMED BY THE "AGE" ORDER.

The "AGE" Order presumes and allows that a claimant is half disabled for manual labor at the age of 62; two-thirds disabled

age of 68, and wholly disabled at the age

part of the assailants, and slight on the part of the defenders. The only possible result to be gained by such attacks was, therefore, the forcing of the enemy from

BETTER TURN THAN ATTACK A POSITION

But this might have been done without loss by a simple turning movement, and the principles of war admonish the use of this means in preference to an attack in

his position.

he has greater disability at these respective ages than is recited above, it is of no use for him to describe his ailments. It is a disadvantage, in fact, because it will incur the expense and delay of medical examination. If a claimant is in fair health for his age, it is useless to apply for more than is allowed by the "age" order.

Any one, however, who is sure that he is more disabled than is allowed for by the "AGE" Order should write to R. W. Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Washington, D. C., and a proper blank will be mailed him without cost.

Widows.

Upon the death of your soldier husband. apply for pension promptly. It is one of the provisions he leaves for your maintenthing is lost by delay. Write to R. W. Shoppell, or The National Tribune, Washington, D. C., and a proper blank will be mailed you without cost.

OTHER CLASSES OF CLAIMS.

We are prepared to prosecute all kinds of claims other than those already referred to. Write us briefly about them.

Do not write long letters, and address answers and all correspondence to R. W. at the age of 65; five-sixths disabled at the Shoppell, or THE NATIONAL TRIB-UNE, 339 Penn. Ave., Washington, D. C.

condition of the opposing armies and their front, in every case where, by this means, mmanders.

Whatever was done after that should this was the means by which, eventually, have been done to accomplish the ultimate after a heavy waste of life, the enemy was result aimed at. This, however, was of dislodged from these lines. It results that achieved be accounted the proof and pro-cedure of a high order of generalship. I result aimed at. This, however, was of shall endeavor to show this by a recur-shall endeavor to show this by a recur-and to capture Richmond, covered by that and to capture Richmond, covered by that

dislodged from these lines. It results that

rence to those simple principles to which great military questions may almost always be reduced.

Having determined to advance upon Richmond by an overland march, it depended on Gen. Grant's own will to give his operations what character he pleased. This, at least, was true after the battle of the Wilderness, which was an inevitable action, determined less by strategic or tactical considerations than by the moral it here. "Turenne," says he, "constantly observed the two maxims: 1st, Never at observed the two maxims: 1st, Never attack a position in front, when you can obtain it by turning it; 2d, Avoid doing what the enemy wishes, and that simply because he does wish it. Shun the field of battle which he has reconnoitered and studied, and more particularly that in which he has fortified and intrenched himself."—Montholon and Gourgaud: Memoirs of Napoleon, vol. iii, p. 95.

to descend to some of the points of action traverse an open field several hundred yards in width. Dispositions being completed towards 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Hancock held the left of the whole sion of Barlow on the left and Gibbon on the right, with Birney supporting. Barlow, formed in two lines, advanced, and found the enemy strongly posted in a sunken road in front of his works. From this, after a severe struggle, the enemy was dislodged and followed into his works for the night, after dispositions to secure what had been gained. The casualties in this action were severe, being upwards where several hundred prisoners, a color and three guns were taken. The guns were immediately turned upon the enemy of 2,000 men in the two corps. forcing him to retreat in confusion from that part of the line. But this partial suc Great as was the loss in this action, it cess was speedily turned into a reverse; for secured the possession of Cold Harbor, not only did Barlow's second line fail to come up to the prompt support of the first, (42) but the enemy, speedily reen forced, forced Barlow's troops out of the captured works. They fell back, but not to their original position: to a position far in advance of that from which they had

with the fires of death.

It took hardly more than 10 minutes of

the figment men call time to decide the

battle. There was along the whole line a

rush—the spectacle of impregnable works

-bloody loss—then a sullen falling back, and the action was decided. Conceive of

this in the large, and we shall then be able

moved forward, and but from 30 to 75 yards from the enemy, where, taking ad vantage of the ground, they covered them selves in an astonishingly short time.
Gibbon's advance was simultaneous with Barlow's; but in moving forward, he came upon one of the swamps of the Chickahominy, which widened as the line (nearly four miles in extent), there was chickshominy, which widened as the line still an interval between his left and neared the enemy's intrenchments. This Smith's right. To close this gap, Warren separated his command; but the troops, was directed by Gen. Meade to extend his at a fearful sacrifice, advanced close up left, while Burnside's command was to re-tire altogether from its place on the right them. Col. McMahon, with a part of his of the line, and mass on the right and rear of Warren. When Burnside, during the afternoon of the 2d, was in the act of executing this movement, the enemy, detecting it, followed up with a line of battle, the enemy's hands, losing his colors with drove Burnside's skirmish line through a honor. The gallant Cols. Porter, Morris, swamp, capturing many, and then penetrating between Warren's line of battle and his skirmish line, cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting between the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting the cut off and took prisoners about 400 men. This sudden attracting the cut of tack of course put an end to Warren's close to the hostile works, that the men hominy.

Lee disposed his force on the hither side | doubtful whether it reached that many of the Chickahominy, in an excellent po- hundreds. sition for defense, having the front of ap-proach obstructed by thickets and cut up by marshes. The Union force was drawn up in the order already given-Hancock's Corps on the left; then the Sixth Corps; your adversary at the actual point of conthen Smith's command; then Warren and Burnside on the right. The left rested across the Dispatch Station road, the right on Tolopotomy Creek. Sheridan with two divisions of horse held the lower crossings of the Chickshominy and covered the roads to White House. The other cav-alry division under Wilson took post on the right. The manner of attack ordered was of the kind already so often made in the course of this campaign—a general assault along the whole front of six miles, to be made at 4:30 in the morning. Next morning, with the first gray light dawn struggling through the clouds, the preparations began: from behind the rude parapets there was an upstarting, a

HARBOR

tact be a cardinal maxim of war, it is not easy to discover on what ground success can be hoped from such general assaults along a line of many miles, and consequently everywhere weak, made by corpscommanders independently of each other, and directed against positions which have not been reconnoitered, over most unequal conditions of terrain, and at a uniform and precise moment fixed for all by the watch. If this rude and primitive array sufficed, one might forget all that experi ence has taught and genius devised of the means by which success is snatched on the field of battle—one might forget that there are key-points on every field—that it is the aim of the commander to determine this point on his actual front, and springing to arms, the muffled commands of officers forming the line. The attack was ordered at 4:30, and it may have been then by massing heavily against it, by concentrating his force into a focus of fiery energy, instead of dissipating it in five minutes after that, or it may have indefinite space, to seize such masterbeen 10 minutes, but it certainly was not later than 45 minutes past 4, when the ground as may give the opening for a dewhole line was in motion, and the dark hollows between the armies were lit up

THERE WERE UNAVAILED POSSIBILITIES. The bloody experiment at Cold Harbor, far from disproving this principle of action, signally confirmed it; for while the assault along the whole line everywhere failed, there was at least one tactical point on the field which, had dispositions suited to the occasion been made, might have been seized, and a path to success opened. This point was a bald hight opposite the Union left, named Watt's Hill, dominating the whole ground, and covering the angle of the Dispatch road. Along this ridge, on which Lee's right rested, the Confederate line formed a salient, and in front of it was the sunken road from which Hancock's left division dislodged the enemy, and then, by an impetuous rush, carried, and for a mo-ment held the works beyond. But so little not till after its blood-bought victory had gate, 13,153. been snatched from that slender force, that the supreme importance of this position was appreciated. By this time the position had been reenforced by the enemy, and the

opportune moment was of course lost; but had a heavy force at first been massed against that point, it might not only have been held, but the entire hostile line would then have been taken in reverse. After the failure of the first assault.

o'clock in the afternoon, offensive operations were formally suspended, and the corps-commanders were ordered to in-trench their advanced positions. Next day siege operations were begun, with a view to carry the defenses of the Chickshominy by regular approaches. But this work also, at the end of a few days, ceased, and Gen. Grant determined to change his line of operations to the south side of the James River. The circumstances under which this determination was made, and the manner in which it was carried into execution, will be detailed in the succeeding campaign.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE OVERLAND CAM-The course of this narrative has already

The campaign indeed resembled less or